Following Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,1 lower courts across the country were tasked with applying the Supreme Court’s “concrete” injury standard to a wide range of privacy and cyber claims. These claims range from the improper retention of personally identifying information to the exposure of client or customer data after a breach. But regardless of the type of claim or the factual allegations, the lack of a bright-line rule has forced lower courts to analyze standing resulting from technical statutory violations on a case-by-case basis. This case-specific analysis has created Circuit splits that will likely continue unless and until a clear-cut rule is articulated by the Supreme Court.
The Flexible “Concrete” Injury Standard
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court noted that “Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”2 Thus, while a statute may provide a private right of action, the plaintiff must still prove that there was a concrete and particularized harm to establish standing. The Supreme Court stated that “‘[c]oncrete’ is not . . . necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible;’” intangible injuries—and particularly those that Congress has elevated to be a legally cognizable injury—can also be concrete.3 In other words, merely the “risk of real harm” may be sufficient to satisfy the “requirement of concreteness.”4
The major effect of Spokeo’s flexible standard has been the inconsistent opinions coming out of lower courts. Both plaintiffs and defendants have found support for their arguments that there is, or is not, standing. This is clearly evident in privacy and cybersecurity litigation, and particularly in class actions, where plaintiffs often allege statutory violations and cite to the “risk” of real harm. We consider four of a number of recent cases.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA); California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA)
Campbell v. Facebook (9th Cir. 2020)
In Campbell v. Facebook, the plaintiff alleged that Facebook violated ECPA and CIPA through the nonconsensual capturing, reading, and use of website links included in private messages sent or received by users.5 In its March 3, 2020 opinion relating to a proposed class settlement, the 9th Circuit determined, in finding standing, that when “a statutory provision identifies a substantive right that is infringed any time it is violated, a plaintiff bringing a claim under that provision ‘need not allege any further harm to have standing.’”6 As to ECPA and CIPA, the 9th Circuit stated that “[t]he harms protected by these statutes bear a ‘close relationship’ to ones that have ‘traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit.’”7
The 9th Circuit’s analysis reveals that post-Spokeo, lower courts will look at the alleged statutory violation of a right to privacy in light of the privacy protections available at common law. Specifically, the 9th Circuit explained that in the years since Spokeo, the Circuit Court has “identified several statutory provisions that guard against invasions of concrete privacy interests.”8 Legislation that proscribes harm for which there has historically been a basis for a lawsuit is more likely to meet the Article III standard for concrete harm. Thus, as long as a party claims a violation of concrete privacy interests such as those protected under ECPA and CIPA, the 9th Circuit says nothing more is needed to support standing.9
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA)
Bryant v. Compass Group USA Inc. (7th Cir. 2020)
On May 5, the 7th Circuit applied Spokeo in Bryant v. Compass Group USA Inc.10 In Bryant, the plaintiff alleged that a vending machine owner and operator violated section 15(b) of BIPA by collecting her fingerprint to enable the purchase of items without obtaining her written consent.11 In its opinion, the 7th Circuit relied heavily upon a rubric outlined by Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Spokeo—a distinction between the vindication of “private” and “public” rights.12 Consequently, the 7th Circuit determined that the “[plaintiff] was asserting a violation of her own rights—her fingerprints, her private information—and that this is enough to show injury-in-fact without further tangible consequences.”13
In reaching this conclusion, the 7th Circuit declined to follow the 2nd Circuit’s holding in Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software.14 Evaluating similar allegations of failure to secure informed consent before collecting biometric data, the 2nd Circuit concluded that “none of the alleged procedural violations raised ‘a material risk of harm’ to a plaintiff's interest in ‘prevent[ing] the unauthorized use, collection, or disclosure of an individual's biometric data.’”15 In contrast to Santana, the 7th Circuit found that the plaintiff in Bryant alleged more than a mere procedural violation and analogized the defendant’s actions to an act of trespass. The 7th Circuit also evaluated the allegations as a “type of informational injury.”16 From this perspective, the 7th Circuit concluded that a “concrete” injury existed. Specifically, the Circuit Court stated that “injury inflicted by nondisclosure is concrete if the plaintiff establishes that the withholding impaired her ability to use the information in a way the statute envisioned.”17
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)
Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc. (7th Cir. 2020); Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019)
A Circuit split has developed over the impact of Spokeo on a plaintiff’s standing to bring a TCPA claim. In Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc.,18 the 7th Circuit addressed the question of whether the receipt of a single unwanted text message caused a concrete injury. The 7th Circuit noted that Spokeo instructed courts to look to both history and Congress’s judgment to determine whether an intangible harm protected by a statute has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for suit under the common law.19 The 7th Circuit followed prior decisions from the 9th and 2nd Circuits and held that the receipt of one or two text messages was sufficiently analogous to the common law claim for intrusion upon seclusion to create standing.20 The 7th Circuit acknowledged that at common law, courts required a substantial imposition on the privacy of the plaintiff from many calls. However, the court reasoned that when Spokeo instructed courts to analogize to harms recognized by the common law, courts were only meant to look for a “close relationship” in kind, not degree. Congress has the power to “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”21
In reaching its decision, the 7th Circuit rejected the 11th Circuit’s holding in Salcedo v. Hanna.22 In Salcedo, the 11th Circuit held that the receipt of a single text message advertisement did not create standing. The 11th Circuit noted that the text and legislative history of the TCPA is completely silent on the subject of text messages. The 11th Circuit also noted that Congress failed to include text messaging in any of the amendments to the TCPA over the years.23 The 11th Circuit found that the common law claim for intrusion upon seclusion was not sufficiently analogous to the harm the TCPA was intended to protect when it came to cell phones. In support of this conclusion, the 11th Circuit cited to the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 652B for the rule that “only when the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff.”24 The 11th Circuit also noted that intrusion upon seclusion requires an intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of an individual or his private affairs or concerns from such things as eavesdropping, wiretapping or looking through someone’s personal papers.25 After assessing the qualitative harm, not the quantitative harm, from receiving a text message solicitation, the 11th Circuit concluded that receiving one text messages was not the kind of harm that constitutes injury in fact.26 The court left open the question of whether the receipt of multiple unwanted and unsolicited text messages could create standing.
In light of the emerging Circuit splits, plaintiffs are seeking and will likely continue to seek out specific jurisdictions they believe analyze standing in a way that appears favorable. Such litigants already include some people seeking relief under as yet untested statutes, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). However, the case-specific and statute-specific nature of most courts’ analysis means that forum selection does not guarantee victory. Until the Supreme Court provides further guidance, the only certainty is that district courts and Circuit Courts will continue to be most heavily influenced by the specific facts of each case, including the language of particular statutes, the severity of the incident, the amount and sensitivity of information collected, and the risks of future harm.
1. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
2. Id. at 1548 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)).
3. Id. at 1549.
5. Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 951 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2020).
6. Id. at 1117 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017)).
7. Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).
8. Id.; see, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) (federal Wiretap Act, federal Stored Communications Act, and California Invasion of Privacy Act), Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1269, 1271–75 (9th Cir. 2019) (BIPA); Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 981, 983–84 (Video Privacy Protection Act); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1041–43 (9th Cir. 2017) (Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
9. See also In Re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, Case No. 5:10-cv-04809-EJD (N.D. Cal., Jun. 5, 2020) (court denied Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, citing Campbell and other 9th Circuit authority, and stated that ECPA created “a concrete privacy interest in communications stored with electronic communication service providers—even if those communications cannot be linked to the user.” (at p. 12)).
10. Bryant v. Compass Group USA Inc., 958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020).
11. BIPA is a 2008 statute of Illinois’ General Assembly that created a right to privacy in and control over an individual’s biometric identifiers and biometric information. See Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (eff. 10-03-08).
12. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 624.
14. Id. at 623 (declining to follow Santana v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 717 F. App'x 12 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order)).
15. Santana, 717 F. App'x at 15.
16. Bryant, 958 F.3d at 624.
18. Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc., 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020).
19. Id. at 462 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1549).
20. Id. at 462-63 (following Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2019) and Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042–43).
21. Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1549).
22. Id. (rejecting Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1172 (11th Cir. 2019)).
23. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1168-69.
24. Id. at 1171 (quoting Rest. (2d) Torts § 652B cmt. d).
25. Id. (citing Rest. (2d) Torts § 652B cmt. b).
26. Id.at 1173.
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